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Abstract
This paper explores the processes through which Canada’s
immigration system creates human insecurity for new-
comers to Canada. With a focus on the new Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act and post-September 11 securi-
ty measures such as the Safe Third Country Agreement, I
argue that the immigration system draws on and reaf-
firms national security discourses. Measures designed to
create national security, in turn, create human insecurity
for migrants and refugees.  Using a feminist approach
that explores how gender, race, and class oppressions in-
tensify experiences of in/security, this paper suggests that
the new national security measures within Canada’s im-
migration system will likely have a disproportionate im-
pact on classed, raced, and gendered asylum seekers.
Résumé
Cet article examine comment les processus utilisés par le
système d’immigration du Canada créent un environne-
ment d’insécurité pour les nouveaux arrivés au Canada.
Me concentrant sur la nouvelle Loi sur l’immigration et
la protection des réfugiés et les mesures de sécurité mises
en place après le 11 septembre, tel que l’Entente sur les
tiers pays sûrs, je soutiens que le système d’immigration
se fonde sur les discours de sécurité nationale et contribue
à les avaliser. Les mesures destinées à renforcer la sécuri-
té nationale créent à leur tour des conditions d’insécurité
pour les immigrants et les réfugiés. Utilisant une appro-
che féministe qui explore comment les abus d’autorité ba-
sés sur des considérations de sexe, de race et de classe
intensifient les expériences d’insécurité, cet article suggère
que les nouvelles mesures de sécurité contenues dans le
système d’immigration du Canada auront un impact
hors de toute proportion sur les demandeurs d’asile victi-
mes de discrimination basées sur ces mêmes considéra-
tions de classe, de race et de sexe.
Over the past year, Canadians have witnessed a diz-zying array of changes to the laws, policies, andpractices aimed at policing and regulating “foreign-
ers.” In the interests of national security the Canadian go-
vernment  has initiated  a series  of measures designed to
police borders and restrict access to Canada, especially for
those from the developing world. An overhaul of the Immi-
gration Act represented the first of these reforms, and cons-
titutes major changes to Canada’s immigration policies. The
new Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA or Act)
was introduced to Parliament prior to September 11, and
received Royal Assent on November 1, 2001. While the Act
itself wasn’t directly influenced by the terrorist attacks in
New York City and Washington, it nevertheless contained
reforms interested in curbing the potential dangers that
refugees allegedly pose to Canada. The accompanying final
Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (Regula-
tions) for  the  new Act were  released on June 11, 2002.
Post-September 11 jitters have also resulted in several new
national security measures aimed at newcomers, including
the proposed Safe Third Country Agreement, which will go
even  further  in  limiting  the  rights of asylum seekers to
meaningful representation, due process, and protection.
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In this paper I argue that as Canada draws its borders
tighter in the name of national security the human security
of asylum seekers is being put at risk. As Canadian immi-
gration practices and policies illustrate, “nationalism as an
ideology and the national interest as an objective of state
policy are often opposed to the satisfaction of general hu-
man needs.”1
Defining Human Security
Security concerns of Western states have traditionally focu-
sed on the primacy of territorial security and sovereignty and
on the belief that a state can achieve security through arms
and deterrence. This external security focus heavily relied on
military security and the activities of the state’s intelligence
community.2 During the Cold War security policy was based
on the assumption that international politics were a threat
to peace and welfare. Communism, in particular, was seen
as a threat to the nation and capitalist economic interests.3
This point is well illustrated by the actions of the RCMP
during the  Cold  War, as they kept tabs on about eight
hundred thousand Canadians thought to be communist or
sympathetic to communism.4 In response to the perceived
threat that communism posed, a militarized conception of
state security was entrenched in the West5 that was concer-
ned with nuclear deterrence, military strength, power blocs,
and interstate relations.6
However, recognizing that traditional security concerns
did not create peace or stability in the world, public interest
groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and ac-
tivists transformed the concept of security into a concern
with human security. In Canada, human security entered
the vocabulary of the Liberal government in the mid-1990s7
and would soon become the central focus of Canadian
foreign policy.8 However,  the state approach to  human
security differs widely from the definition of advocates,
activists, and academics.
For the latter, the human security approach “involves
replacing the state as primary reference and giving primacy
to human beings.”9 The starting point “is understanding
security in terms of the real-life, everyday experience of
humanity embedded within global social and economic
structures.”10 In particular, human security takes into ac-
count structures that lead to poverty, unequal gender rela-
tions, and other inequalities.11 A focus on social and
economic factors that threaten the security of human
beings necessitates a look at the “quiet killers”: hunger,
epidemics, internal violence, environment, prenatal de-
fects, malnutrition, repression, pollution, etc. As many of
these quiet killers manifest themselves within the so-called
private sphere of family life,12 they are of special importance
to women and the in/security they experience.
As so much human insecurity13 is experienced in the
“private sphere,” and as violence, sex, and gender oppres-
sions perpetuate human insecurity for women, a feminist
approach that focuses on unequal power relations of gen-
der, race, and class is necessary to understand how women
experience human insecurity. This approach asks: how do
institutions and organizations design unequal power rela-
tions? How do they perpetuate these relations? How do
unequal social relations make human insecurity?14
Human Security and the Canadian State
The concept of human security is central to Canada’s foreign
policy and Canada’s humanitarian image at home and abro-
ad.15 However, official understandings of the concept are
quite different from the feminist and/or activist oriented
understandings that I have outlined above. Under former
Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy, it was
recognized that poverty and inequity caused human insecu-
rity. However, responses to that insecurity were based on
neo-liberal economic policies. More recent conceptualiza-
tions of human security explicitly combine the human secu-
rity agenda with national security interests. Within these
approaches to human security, there appears to be no atten-
tion paid to the specific ways in which women experience
human in/security.
During his tenure as Foreign Affairs Minister, Axworthy
argued that the Cold War approach to security was not able
to bring about peace or security. Thus, he conceptualized
human security as “much more than the absence of military
threat. It includes security against economic privation, an
acceptable quality of life, and a guarantee of fundamental
human rights.”16 He noted the importance of addressing
economic need and poverty abroad in order to eradicate
human insecurity, and seemed to recognize that inequity
between people is a cause of insecurity. Axworthy even
identified factors that lead to external and forced migration,
such as conflict and disaster. But a closer look at Axwor-
thy’s conceptualization of human security shows its roots
in neo-liberal assumptions about economic deve-
lopment.
For example, Axworthy argued that Canada’s foreign
policy meets human security challenges through rules-ba-
sed trade and multilateral trading systems, as well as
through programs such as peacekeeping and peacebuil-
ding. Further he suggested that: “rules-based trade creates
a stable trade environment and counters those protectionist
tendencies which often result from cyclical downturns.
Rules, in short, level the playing field.”17 For Axworthy and
the federal Liberals, encouraging a neo-liberal approach to
development in the South leads to economic, political, and
social stability. This approach to human security relies on
Creating Human Insecurity

institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and
World Bank to prevent and manage economic crises, and
often results in the imposition of structural adjustment
programs. And, as Neufeld points out, this approach is
imbedded in traditional notions of security, as the goal is to
use finance as a means to prevent and manage crisis in other
states.18
What this approach fails to appreciate is that economic
globalization often creates conditions from which asylum
seekers flee.  In her study of human  security  and deve-
lopment, Caroline Thomas argues that two-thirds of the
global population have not benefited from economic
growth generated by globalization. It is the highly skilled
and those in management who are reaping most of the
benefits. Precarious workers, such as those employed under
conditions where businesses are offered incentives (e.g.,
low labour costs), may gain temporary benefits from glo-
balization but remain vulnerable to the marketplace. And
it is the marginalized, those most at risk of human insecu-
rity in the first place, who suffer under globalization. For
example, with economic restructuring the poor must absorb
the costs of formerly public, but now private, services.19
Thus Axworthy failed to recognize the costs of globaliza-
tion to the poor and marginal. His conceptualization of
human security also had no understanding of how gender
relations, gender roles, and oppression perpetuate human
insecurity for women. Before assuming that human securi-
ty can be reached through neo-liberal economic policies,
questions about women’s experiences of neo-liberalism
must be asked. For example: How do neo-liberal economic
policies affect women’s work in the home and in the
workplace? How do they affect women’s standard of living
and ability to feed themselves and their children? Despite
obvious gender concerns, the Liberal government seemed
unable to formulate, or not interested in formulating, a
gender analysis.
Within the last few years Canada’s approach to human
security has shifted. Canada continues to promote market-
based strategies and its own economic interests abroad,20
but the cursory nod to poverty and privation (however
problematic) has been replaced by concern for market
upheavals.  In  the 1999 “Speech from the Throne,” the
government prioritized conflict, disease, upheavals (econo-
mic and political), and environmental disasters. In particu-
lar, Canada has “chosen to focus its human security agenda
on promoting safety for people from threats of violence.”21
In 2002, major threats to human security are further being
defined as terrorism, drug trafficking, and the illicit trade
in small arms. The Foreign Affairs website claims that: “this
new generation of threats shows no respect for national
borders  and inevitably  becomes the source  of our  own
insecurity.”22 Thus, protection of Canada’s borders is un-
derstood to be both a human security and national security
concern.
This change in direction for human security is not simply
a response to the terrorist attacks of September 11. As far
back as 1999, the Foreign Affairs website explained that a
focus on violence “is where the concept of human security
has the greatest value-added as a complement to existing
international agendas already focussed on promoting na-
tional security, human rights, and human development.”23
Thus, we can see, over the past few years, a movement away
from broader human security concerns to a narrower defi-
nition. The renewed “human security” priority of violence
and security threats seems to be tacked on to foreign policy
already prioritized by the government. And, for the govern-
ment, national security concerns frame how they chose to
conceptualize human security. Thus, human and national
security are understood by Foreign Affairs to be comple-
mentary:
. . . people are made safer by an open, tolerant and responsive
state capable of ensuring the protection of all of its citizens. At
the same time, enhancing human security reinforces the state
by strengthening its legitimacy and stability. A secure and stable
world order is built both from the bottom up and the top
down.24
Within this paradigm there is no discussion of the ways in
which national security interests can negatively impact hu-
man security (let alone any thought to how this process may
be raced, classed, or gendered), and at the same time some
important human security concerns are removed from the
agenda.25
National security agendas and human security needs are
not compatible in the lives of those seeking asylum, as
national security measures can in fact contribute to human
insecurity. IRPA and the proposed  Safe Third Country
Agreement are meant to boost national security and protect
Canada’s borders. But, as I argue in subsequent sections,
these national security measures negatively impact the hu-
man security of asylum seekers in Canada. The Canadian
government understands human insecurity as something
to be gained in other places, as something needed by “o-
ther” people. In the domestic context, human insecurity is
thought to be under threat from “other” people and other
places. However, I contend that the Canadian government
needs to recognize and address the human insecurity it
causes for asylum seekers in its domestic refugee and border
control policies.
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The Refugee Crisis as the Refugee ‘Threat’
Successive Canadian governments have tended to argue that
immigration is good for business. It brings cheap labour into
the country, boosts consumption of Canada’s goods and
services, and creates employment. Immigration policy rela-
ting to economic immigration serves nation-building and
capitalism, and often those chosen for citizenship meet the
vision of Canada.26 Within this paradigm, independent or
economic immigrants are seen as good for the country, and
are the privileged class of immigrants within the system.27
But, if economic immigrants are wanted, those in the family
and refugee classes are merely tolerated. They are viewed as
benefiting from our humanitarianism, rather than benefi-
ting Canada. Refugees in particular are understood to be
“charity cases,” rather than human beings entitled to protec-
tion.28 And, in the West’s darkest fears, they are imagined to
be a threat to the body politic.
In fact, since the emergence of the nation-state, refugees
have been seen as a threat to the identity of the nation and
its security.29 In Canada, concerns about national security
have historically been used against refugees, particularly
those from non-white and/or working class origins. For
example, in the years between the World Wars, commu-
nists, socialists, and unionists were deported as a means to
silence social dissent and political organizing.30 During the
Cold War, however, Canada (and the West) had a different
relationship to refugees, a time that Reg Whitaker refers to
as the “golden era.”31 During this period, refugees were
chosen on the basis of their ideological backgrounds, in
order to add support to the ideological stance of the state.
The influx of refugees from communist countries highligh-
ted the superiority of capitalism and the inferiority of the
politics and policies of the Soviet Union. Refugees from the
political left who would question state ideology were admit-
ted in small numbers. With the collapse of the USSR and
the increased flow of racialized peoples from the Third
World,  states realized that refugees no longer  provided
ideological legitimacy.32 In Canada, the refugee discourse
has since shifted to the security of Canadians and the need
to protect ourselves from false claimants and those who
“abuse” the system.
It is within this context that refugee advocates, acade-
mics, and bodies such as the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have noted the growing
tensions between the “language of protection and the reality
of rejection.”33 In this new “closing doors era,”34 the dis-
course has turned to the “refugee crisis.” However, the crisis
of concern isn’t necessarily that crisis experienced by refu-
gees, but rather the crisis that refugees allegedly pose to
receiving states. This sense of crisis has many causes.
Among them are: (1) asylum seekers who bypass the system
are viewed as a challenge to the sovereignty of states; (2) the
conflicts that the Cold War held in check are now brewing
or boiling over, thus displacing more and more people; (3)
there is  a widening gap between the North and South,
causing many to flee the South in search of a better life; (4)
security is  being redefined  to include the protection of
national and cultural identities based on the assumption
that migration threatens such identities;35 and (5) it is feared
that refugees bring with them the conflicts and instability
they are fleeing.36
These concerns about the threats that refugees allegedly
pose rest on many assumptions. First is the assumption that
asylum seekers challenge state sovereignty. (This assump-
tion itself is based on the belief that states have the right to
determine who enters their borders, or that borders should
even exist.) Yet it is clear that “participation in the refugee
regime does not imply an open door policy nor an abroga-
tion of [that] sovereignty.”37 On the contrary, the Canadian
state has consistently used its authority to develop restric-
tions on who may and may not enter the country. Thus,
while sovereignty is used as a reason for cracking down on
“illegal” migrants, I suggest that the crackdown itself rein-
forces (the legitimacy of) state sovereignty.
Refugee crisis discourse also positions asylum seekers as
posing a threat to the cultural security of receiving coun-
tries, as citizens fear being culturally and politically taken
over.38 Despite Canada’s official multiculturalism policies,
such concerns are clearly manifested here as new Canadians
are expected to practice a neutral form of “difference.”
Cultural differences are tolerated when they are unthreate-
ning – for example in the form of “saris, samosas and steel
bands.”39 However, if a group makes political demands,40
or if its members define their own experiences of difference
and resist hegemonic understandings of their “otherness,”41
they may be seen as a threat to the nation and the white
culture. These concerns about the cultural and political
threat posed by migrants are rooted in racism, and specific
ideas about what constitutes the “self-citizen” and the “o-
ther.” Concerns about the increasing “flood” or “tidal
wave” of asylum seekers from the South are informed by
the urge to protect national (white) culture. What those
who espouse this discourse fail to appreciate is that colo-
nialism was a crucial factor in the development of the
North/South divide,42 and that the North profits from the
continuing exploitation of the South. Ultimately, it is these
economic inequalities  and  resulting societal  instabilities
that create conditions from which people must flee.
But  perhaps the greatest risk associated with asylum
seekers is the threat that they allegedly pose to the security
of the nation, specifically through acts of terrorism. The
question that needs to be asked is whether or not asylum
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seekers actually pose a serious risk to Canada on terrorism
or security grounds. And is this risk greater than that posed
by the nation’s own citizens? We now know that the terro-
rist acts of September 11 were not perpetrated by asylum
seekers.43 In fact, domestic terrorism has proven to be as
much a threat to nations as international terrorism. Fur-
ther, terrorists do not need access to Western nations in
order to enact terrorism against those nations; they can
simply target embassies or military bases abroad.44 Thus,
immigration and refugee controls cannot stop or prevent
terrorist acts against the nation. Yet, despite the lack of
terrorist activity perpetrated by asylum seekers, nations are
choosing to crack down on refugees, framing them as a
security threat.
Many scholars also argue that such fears are real. Nazare
Albuquerque Abell, for example, suggests that potential
threats are exaggerated, but “not without foundation as
long as terrorism continues to be a global phenomenon.”45
Whitaker also suggests that pleas on behalf of refugees will
not be taken seriously if they do not take into account the
arguments put forward by those concerned with national
security.46 However, at the risk of not being taken seriously,
I do  not find arguments  that focus on the threats that
asylum seekers pose to national security to be compelling
reasons to close our doors. Certainly, not as long as defini-
tions of terrorism and security threats are informed by the
political motivations and needs of receiving states, and in
the racist attitudes of the West. Nor can I accept that my
rights as a citizen of Canada should supersede the rights of
asylum seekers to apply for and receive protection. I suggest
that security measures such as interdiction, the imposition
of eligibility criteria on asylum seekers, and inadmissibility
provisions, which I discuss below, are rooted in fear (and
fear-mongering) rather than in danger.47 And, in turn, these
strategies of exclusion pose a risk to the human security of
asylum seekers.
Technologies of Exclusion in Canadian Refugee
Policy
Within Canadian refugee policy, concerns about the threats
that asylum seekers pose have manifested in various strate-
gies to prevent them from gaining access to Canada. The
1976 Immigration Act, for example, maintained the state’s
ability to be selective in choosing refugees for resettlement
by including those in “refugee-like” situations. (This also
allowed the state to chose refugees with ideological value, as
I discussed above.) By combining Convention Refugees and
refugee-like classes we can be selective – take the “best” of
an unwelcome lot, as it were. An outcome of this policy has
been that most humanitarian intake is selected from areas
with the least number of refugees and where the majority of
those chosen are economically active men,48 despite the fact
that 80 per cent of the world’s refugees are women and their
dependent children.49
Another method the government has used to restrict
access to Canada for asylum seekers is through its successful
establishment criteria.50 A refugee is accepted not only on
her criteria as a Convention Refugee but on the basis of
whether she will likely be able to establish herself in Canada.
The Regulations for IRPA require the following for refu-
gees, except those deemed vulnerable or in urgent need of
protection: resourcefulness, presence of relatives or the
sponsor in the community where they resettle, potential for
employment, and ability to learn English or French.51 Clear-
ly, these criteria have nothing to do with one’s status as a
Convention Refugee. Rather they reflect the criteria used to
select immigrants. And this determination process is not
gender neutral. Citizenship and Immigration Canada’s
(CIC) own gender analysis finds:
. . . current policy that includes an assessment of the ability to
establish successfully has a negative impact on women at risk.
Women claimants may be hampered by their responsibilities as
primary caregivers, poor ability in either official language, lack
of education or poor job  skills,  or a  combination of these
factors.52
The document goes on to suggest that the criteria should be
gender sensitive, a suggestion that is clearly being ignored by
CIC.
These practices now entrenched in the Regulations of
IRPA clearly place the human security of asylum seekers at
risk. For the CIC it is not enough to be a Convention
Refugee; one must be a refugee most likely to find belonging
and acceptance in Canada. Women, those from the South,
and the poor in particular pay a price for these policies, as
they are less likely to meet selection criteria and thus can
be passed over for the more desirable asylum seekers.
These policies marginalize the most marginal of refugees –
women, the poor, and people of colour. Human insecurity
– physical, emotional and psychological – is thus exacer-
bated by social relations of race, class, and gender. To
purposefully attempt to exclude the most marginal of asy-
lum seekers is to perpetuate and perpetrate human insecu-
rity.
Exclusion and the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act
Canada’s new Immigration and Refugee Protection Act con-
tinues to exclude those deemed to be a threat. CIC’s website
promises that the Act “strikes a balance between measures
to address the security and safety of Canadians and Canada’s
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borders on the one hand, and our traditions of welcoming
visitors and immigrants and protecting refugees on the o-
ther.”53 Further, they argue that it “allows us to say ‘no’ more
quickly to those who would take advantage of our generosity
and openness.”54 This all-too-familiar discourse reinforces
problematic and widespread notions about the dangers
that newcomers bring with them, the threat they allegedly
pose to the security of Canadians,  and the belief that
asylum seekers abuse the system or jump the queue to get
here.55
In Bill C-31 (the predecessor to IRPA) former CIC Mi-
nister Elinor Caplan said that one of her goals was to “close
the backdoor to those who would abuse the system.”56 One
of the ways in which CIC intends to do this is by continuing
the practice of interdiction – stopping people without ade-
quate identity papers from getting to Canada. Interdiction
is based on the assumption that those without papers either
abuse the system or pose a danger because they are not who
they say they are. However, as advocacy groups such as
Amnesty International (AI) and the Canadian Council for
Refugees (CCR) point out, it may not be possible for some
people to get to Canada with proper identity documents, as
these documents must be obtained from hostile govern-
ments and situations from which asylum seekers are fleeing.
Yet, increased interdiction practices, and announced in-
creases in immigration control officers abroad, suggest that
the CIC believes that the undocumented are not genuine
refugees.57
Interdiction is particularly problematic for women. In
yet another disregarded gender-based analysis performed
on IRPA, CIC recognizes that:
Women  and children  often have  less access to documents
because of prevailing traditions and cultural norms, the admi-
nistrative inefficiency of source countries, remote geographi-
cal locations, overt discriminatory practices and persecution,
or the destruction of documents through wars or armed con-
flicts. Proposals that place a priority on documentation, and
that base credibility assessments on documentation, without
weighing this kind of evidence against other forms of valida-
tion, could have disproportionate and negative impacts on
women.58
Many of the same concerns can also be raised about the
discriminatory impact interdiction has on racialized peoples
from the South, as there is generally less infrastructure
available to provide identity documents in poor nations. As
interdiction  disproportionately affects  marginalized peo-
ples, it is disturbing that the Act has no recourse or mecha-
nism to allow exceptions and ensure that refugees are given
access to the refugee determination system.
One of the ironies of interdiction is that freedom of
movement is supposedly a universal human right,59 even as
states actively work against arrival. Thus, for refugees “who
do not possess the means, and who do not have the skills
required by affluent states, movement is far from free.”60
The Canadian state is interdicting people whom it simply
doesn’t want – self-selected asylum seekers. Why? Because
once an asylum seeker makes a claim on Canadian soil, her
case must be heard (with exceptions of inadmissibility, as I
will discuss later). If the claimant is found to be a refugee
she will be given status, and even failed claimants might
receive permanent residence on humanitarian and compas-
sionate grounds. Yet, these are not people that Canada
chooses. While the state chooses immigrants, issues visas to
temporary workers and students, and applies selection cri-
teria to refugees applying from overseas, self-selected asy-
lum seekers remain, to a very limited extent, outside the
control and sovereignty of the state.61 These asylum seekers
often are racialized, poor people – undesirables in the eyes
of CIC.
So, in the name of a sovereignty that is informed by
raced, classed, and gendered notions of who belongs here,
the human security of asylum seekers is put at risk through
interdiction. Those who are intercepted before they reach
Canada are unable to avail themselves of the protection
needed to ensure physical safety and the emotional and
psychological security that comes with escaping traumas
and persecution faced in the homeland. In fact, those who
are interdicted may even be at risk of being sent back to
torture. Such an event is not unprecedented, as in 1998, 192
Tamils were interdicted on the seas, and returned to Sri
Lanka where all were detained, and at least one was tortu-
red.62 Given this outrage perpetrated by the Canadian state
against those asylum seekers, it is perverse that “Canada has
boasted of preventing thirty-three thousand people from
reaching Canada over a five-year period.”63
With the difficulties that many asylum seekers face get-
ting proper documentation and the risks of interdiction,
human smuggling often becomes the only means by which
to escape the home country. Yet, despite the danger that
smuggling can pose, the section of the Act dealing with
trafficking (migration involving force or coercion) and
human smuggling (illegal entry into Canada organized by
individuals or organizations) heavily emphasizes penalty as
opposed to the protection of human rights for smuggled or
trafficked persons.64 But increasing the punishment for
smugglers and traffickers may raise the cost of transporta-
tion and stop even more people from coming to Canada,
making those who do more vulnerable to abuse.65 Further,
the Regulations will consider arrival through smuggling or
trafficking when assessing the flight risk, and possible de-
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tention, of asylum seekers. Despite the fact that Article 31
of the Refugee Convention prohibits punishing those who
arrive illegally, the Regulations suggest that those entering
in this manner would likely be detained.66
While the CIC would argue that the problem is people
coming to Canada illegally, I suggest that the problem is
that people are forced to adopt the services of smugglers to
reach Canada. Being cornered into using the services of
smugglers can also pose a huge problem for women and
children who risk sexual violence and exploitation. Women
and children are in fact in a double bind as they are syste-
matically disadvantaged by the overseas refugee determina-
tion process and at a high risk of abuse from smugglers.
The Canadian state has put a lot of energy into preven-
ting people from making refugee claims on our shores. It
has also developed criteria that exclude certain people from
making a claim, should they reach our borders. In the new
Act a permanent resident or foreign national is considered
inadmissible to Canada under five major grounds:67 secu-
rity grounds, human or international rights violations, se-
rious criminality, criminality, and organized criminality.
Those found to be inadmissible will not receive a refugee
hearing, nor a determination of risk in the event of depor-
tation. In this next section I briefly outline some of the
problems with the inadmissibility provisions regarding se-
curity.
In 1992 (under the federal Conservative government),
Bill C-86 instituted “terrorism abuses” into the Immigra-
tion Act. The changes introduced a new form of criminality
based on past or present membership in a terrorist group,
thus labelling the member of the group a terrorist. In IRPA
terrorism remains a grounds for inadmissibility. Under s.
34 of the Act security grounds include:
(a) engaging in an act of espionage or an act of subversion
against a democratic government, institution or process as they
are understood in Canada; (b) engaging in or instigating the
subversion by force of any government; (c) engaging in terro-
rism; (d) being a danger to the security of Canada; (e) engaging
in acts of violence that would or might endanger the lives or
safety of persons in Canada; or (f) being a member of an
organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe enga-
ges, has engaged or will engage in acts referred to in paragraph
(a), (b) or (c).68
Terrorism is not defined in the Act. However, “terrorist
activity” and “terrorist group” are defined in the Anti-Ter-
rorism Act (of 2002), and these definitions will likely be
applied to the determination of inadmissible persons under
s. 34 of IRPA. Under the Anti-Terrorism Act, the Criminal
Code will be amended to define “terrorist activity” as an
action that takes place either within or outside of Canada
that:
... is an offence under one of the UN anti-terrorism conventions
and protocols; or is taken for political, religious or ideological
purposes and intimidates the public concerning its security, or
compels a government to do something, by intentionally killing,
seriously harming or endangering a person, causing substantial
property damage that is likely to seriously harm people or by
seriously interfering with or disrupting an essential service,
facility or system.69
Groups whose activities meet the definition of terrorist ac-
tivity will be designated as “terrorist groups.” Thus, under
IRPA anyone who has engaged in such activity, or anyone
who there are reasonable grounds to believe is or was a
member of a group that engages, has engaged, or may engage
in such activity, is inadmissible to Canada.
There are many problems with these attempts to define
terrorist activity and terrorist groups, and with the inadmis-
sibility restrictions on security grounds outlined in the Act.
First, any definition of terrorist activity or terrorist groups
is an inherently political one. This definition is also cons-
tantly changing. Take the much cited example of the Afri-
can National Congress (ANC), a group that engaged in acts
of violence against apartheid South Africa but is now the
ruling party of that country. The ANC, under the defini-
tions outlined in the Anti-Terrorism Act, would be declared
a terrorist group, and thus anyone who was or is a member
would not be admissible to Canada under the provisions in
IRPA.70 But was the ANC a terrorist group, or was it an
organization that, among other activities, engaged in armed
struggle against an oppressive state? What is the line be-
tween armed struggle and terrorism? There are many
groups in the developing world that engage in violent strug-
gle, and do so against violent and repressive regimes. Often
such groups also provide services to local communities, and
may in fact be a quasi-state. To label a group “terrorist,”
when it has other important functions in its community, is
too simplistic.71 Further, there are some groups that are not
engaged in terrorism, but have wings or factions that do
engage in such activity.72 Under the IRPA inadmissibility
guidelines, such distinctions will likely not be made.
This example of the ANC also leads to the question of
what constitutes a “member.” Is a member of a terrorist
group someone who pays dues to the organization, a vo-
lunteer in a local Canadian community centre sponsored
by the group, a member of the executive leadership of that
group, etc?73 Clearly, there are problems here with guilt by
association. It is unreasonable to punish a person for simply
being a member of a group if that person was not respon-
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sible for terrorist activity. The Supreme Court of Canada in
its recent decision in Suresh v. Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration argues that those who “innocently contribute
to or become members of terrorist organizations,” should
be able to apply for an exception to the inadmissibility
rules.74 Yet, there is no guarantee that such exception would
be granted under IRPA. While Suresh may help protect
those unaware of a group’s activities, it does not protect
those who have a general knowledge of those activities but
do not take part in them. Such people will, without regard
to their specific experiences, actions, or the context in
which they lived, be denied access to Canada and protection
as refugees.
It is also important to recognize that “legal and policy
discourse on ‘terrorism’ [is]…informed by a moral pa-
nic.”75 Part of this panic is currently grounded in anti-
Muslim rhetoric. Research by the CCR indicates that those
currently inadmissible or in limbo on terrorism-related
grounds include a significant number of Iranians, Kurds,
Sri Lankans, Tamils, Sikhs, Algerians, and Palestinians.76
Thus the wide scope of the terrorism provisions in IRPA
will likely continue to disproportionately affect racialized
peoples, particularly those of Muslim descent
There are alternative ways that the state can exercise its
sovereignty and exclude those who have committed violent
terrorist activities. Aiken has suggested, with regard to the
former Immigration Act, that inadmissibility on security
and terrorism grounds is not necessary as inadmissibility
for criminality covers unlawful acts that include terrorist
activity. This approach would also remove exclusion pro-
visions for members of organizations classified as “terro-
rist.” While this seems a more fair approach, I would also
caution that we remain sceptical about the criminality in-
admissibility provisions in IRPA. If a person has been con-
victed of a terrorist offence in another country, Canada
must remain cautious about the justice system in that state
and its rules of evidence and law, as well as possible moti-
vations underlying such a conviction, such as racial and
ethnic hatred and political repression.
Clearly, inadmissibility provisions will impact on the
human security of asylum seekers as they could be preven-
ted access to Canada and the refugee determination system.
The United Nation’s Refugee Convention does have provi-
sions outlining those not eligible for or entitled to protec-
tion as refugees under Section E (those not in need of
protection) and F (those who have committed crimes against
peace, humanity, war crimes, serious non-political crimes
in home countries, or are guilty of acts contrary to purpo-
ses/principals of the UN) of Article 1.77 However, in the
interest of human security and Canada’s commitment to
protection, I believe that it is crucial that all claims are
heard, and that any allegations of criminality, security vio-
lations, etc. be considered within the context of a refugee
claim. Claimants must be allowed to have their claims heard
by the Refugee Protection Division, so that Convention
Refugees and protected persons are identified and offered
the protection to which they are entitled.
Another possible outcome of the inadmissibility sections
is that a claimant could be deported to her home country
to the threat of torture or death, without being granted a
hearing. The international law about refoulement (return to
death or torture) is somewhat contradictory. Under the
Convention against Torture, which Canada signed in 1987,
Article 3 prohibits refoulement. However, those excluded by
Canada under sections E or F of Article 1 of the Refugee
Convention are not believed to be in need of protection and
could risk refoulement.78 But the UNHCR holds that such
exceptions should be applied restrictively and that the prin-
ciples governing exclusion are supposed to reinforce the
obligation to non-refoule.79 The Canadian court, in Suresh,
also agreed that the “better view is that international law
rejects deportation to torture, even where national security
interests are at stake.” But the court also suggested that
“there is a limited exception to  the prohibition against
removal to torture under the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms.”80 Yet, despite these cautions against refou-
lement and our commitment to the Convention against
Torture, IRPA allows for return to torture. In s. 115 (2) an
exception to non-refoulement can occur if the claimant is
(a) found to be inadmissible on serious criminality grounds
and the Minister believes she is a danger to the public, or
(b) if she is inadmissible for security reasons, for violating
human or international rights, or participation in organi-
zed crime, if the Minister believes the claimant should be
removed on the basis of the severity of the act or because
she is a danger to the public.
Return to torture or  possible death  would obviously
cause human insecurity – physical, emotional and psycho-
logical – to the person at risk. Torture is one of the worst
abuses that can be perpetrated against the human body and
mind. It is unthinkable that a country that claims to have a
commitment to human security and protection against
violence could even entertain the possibility of deporting
someone to face that kind of terror, particularly as we have
seen that determinations of inadmissibility can be informed
by politics, racism, and problematic criteria.
Exclusionary Security Measures – Post-September 11
As an extension of the security measures undertaken in
IRPA, Canada is also tightening security at the border to
make it harder for asylum seekers to make claims here. On
December 3, 2002, Canada and the U.S. announced they
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would be working together on “common security priorities”
and the “deterrence, detection and prosecution of security
threats, the disruption of illegal migration and the efficient
management of legitimate travel.”81 They plan to accomplish
this goal by: reviewing their separate lists of countries requi-
ring visitor’s visas with hopes of harmonizing that list;82
placing more overseas officers to interdict those without
documents; establishing biometric identification; and crea-
ting a Safe Third Country Agreement.
The Safe Third Country Agreement, also called the None
Is Too Many Agreement by refugee advocates,83 is based on
the belief that an asylum seeker should seek asylum in the
first safe country in which she lands. Under the terms of this
agreement, a claimant seeking asylum at the  border of
either Canada or the U.S. would not be allowed to make
that claim if she arrived through the other country. For
example, if a claimant fled Afghanistan, arrived in the U.S.,
and then made her way to Canada to claim asylum, such an
agreement would allow Canada to deport her to the U.S. to
be processed by their system. Under Article 4 of the draft
agreement, there are some exceptions for people with fa-
mily members in the country of choice.84 Such an agree-
ment, if reached, will have a huge impact on asylum seekers
wanting to come to Canada, as anywhere from one-third
to one-half of refugee claimants in Canada enter from the
U.S.85
This agreement is being sold as an attempt to cut down
on false claims and “asylum shopping,” and as a way for
Canada and the U.S. to “burden-share.” However, this
agreement will likely add to the insecurity of claimants in
several ways. First, it limits the agency and right of the
asylum seeker to chose where she wants to live. In the case
of the U.S. there may be many good reasons why claimants
don’t want to make claims there: our system is perceived to
be more fair; asylum seekers may fear the racial tensions
and violent crime that are more prevalent in the U.S.;86 or
they may have friends or a larger more established commu-
nity in Canada.
The question of the fairness of the American system is
particularly important, as advocates are asking: is the U.S.
really a safe third country? A quick look at the facts suggests
otherwise. The United States has a habit of detaining child
migrants, many of whom are kept in either juvenile or adult
jails. In Canada, the detention of a minor is supposed to be
a “measure of last resort,” under s. 60 of IRPA. The U.S.
also refuses to ratify the Convention on the Rights of the
Child.87 The American state has disregarded international
law with a policy to detain all Haitians who make a claim,
as a means to deter other Haitians from doing so. They
engage in expedited removals for those without documents,
except for those with a “credible fear.” However, the deci-
sion of what constitutes a “credible fear” is made by immi-
gration officers, and the claimant has no right to counsel.88
And, in the U.S., those who are in the country illegally have
no constitutional right to appointed counsel in deportation
hearings. Children are also not entitled to free repre-
sentation because deportation hearings are a civil matter.89
Finally, advocates are concerned that women making gen-
der-based claims90 of persecution will have a better chance
of getting a fair hearing in Canada.91
Despite all of these concerns about the American system,
Canada is willing to risk the security of children, women
facing gender persecution, and all asylum seekers in ge-
neral, in its bid to better control who can claim asylum here.
Arbitrary detentions, deportations without a hearing, and
a greater risk of refoulement are just some of the risks that
those forced to claim status in the United States may face if
this agreement is finalized. Once again, in the name of
national security and the safety of citizens,  the human
security of the most marginalized peoples in the world are
being put at risk.
Conclusion
These recent initiatives are about policing and protecting
Canada’s borders and the security of the nation. The dis-
course on which these plans are built suggests that Cana-
dians have something to fear from newcomers, and
positions asylum seekers as abject “foreigners.” National
security interests in our refugee system will likely come at a
human cost for asylum seekers, particularly those already
marginalized through racist, sexist, and class-based social
relations. And, as I have argued, institutional practices wi-
thin the refugee system systemically discriminate against
women, the poor, and people of colour. Thus, contrary to
the stance taken by the Canadian state, human security is not
something that needs only to be addressed abroad. Nor is it
simply about protecting Canadians from “dangerous for-
eigners.” Rather, it would seem that asylum seekers need
protection from Canada’s refugee laws and proposed border
policies, as they are likely, in and of themselves, to be a cause
of human insecurity.
If it is true that “in prioritising the national interest as the
foundation of security, we are often in practice constructing
the very conditions that help to generate instability,”92 then
Canada needs to reassess its security goals. For true security
to exist at the level of the nation, human security in its
broadest sense must exist at all levels of society. It is human
insecurity that leads to social and economic upheaval and
threatens the stability and existence of states. To protect
national security by allowing for human insecurity is short-
sighted and may ultimately result in protection and safety
for no one.
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